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ABSTRACT
With the rapid increase in software exploits, the last few decades
have seen several hardware-level features to enhance security (e.g.,
Intel MPX, ARM TrustZone, Intel SGX, Intel CET). Due to security,
performance and/or usability issues these features have attracted
steady criticism. One such feature is the Intel® Memory Protec-
tion Extensions (MPX), an instruction set architecture extension
promising spatial memory safety at a lower performance cost due to
hardware-accelerated bounds checking. However, recent investiga-
tions into MPX have found that is neither as performant, accurate,
nor precise as cutting-edge software-based spatial memory safety.
As a direct consequence, compiler and operating system support
for MPX is dying, and Intel has begun to manufacture desktop
CPUs without MPX. Nonetheless, given how ubiquitous MPX is, it
provides an excellent yet under-utilized hardware resource that can
be aptly salvaged for security purposes. In this paper, we propose
Simplex, a library framework that re-purposes MPX registers as
general purpose registers. Using Simplex, we demonstrate how
MPX registers can be used to store sensitive information (e.g., en-
cryption keys) directly on the hardware. We evaluate Simplex for
performance and find that its overhead is small enough to permit
its deployment in all but the most performance-intensive code. We
refactored the string.h buffer manipulation functions and found
a geometric mean 0.9% performance overhead. We also modified
the deepsjeng and lbm SPEC CPU2017 benchmarks to use Simplex
and found a 1% and 0.98% performance overhead respectively. Fi-
nally, we investigate the behavior of the MPX context with regards
to multi-process and multi-thread programs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Intel®Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) is an instruction set
architecture (ISA) extension for modern Intel processors providing
spatial memory safety using compile-time intentions. MPX is com-
prised of three key components working in harmony: architectural
support through a set of two configuration, one status, and four
bounds registers; compile-time instrumentation; and run-time sup-
port integrated with the operating system. This run-time manages
enabling and disabling CPU interpretation of MPX instructions
through the configuration registers, sets up the pointer bounds
lookup table, interprets error codes indicated in the status regis-
ter, and coordinates with the operating system to handle memory
management and error handling.
In practice, MPX is unusable in its intended form. It was intended
to be performant, interoperable with uninstrumented legacy code,
and configurable for both debug and release environments without
rewriting the source. However, Oleksenko et al. and Serebryany in-
dependently showed that MPX does not perform as well as software-
and language-based memory safety, demonstrating a 50% amortized
performance overhead with good compiler optimizations, and a
400% worst-case performance overhead [25, 31].
As such, MPX has steadily lost support in the software com-
munity. The GNU C Compiler (GCC) recently removed its libmpx
library and eliminated the instrumentation code, while Clang has
never supported MPX beyond specifying the instruction opcodes in
its x86 targets. Additionally, Linux recently removed its support for
kernel compilation with MPX because of the lack of support from
the GNU community. In short, it now appears that MPX will not
achieve widespread adoption as a memory safety tool that it was
designed for. Yet, MPX is already a supported feature on widely de-
ployed processors (e.g., Skylake). For example, Passmark reported
that by 2017 all of the Intel CPUs that they sold were the first-
generation Skylake model or later [2]. Even a conservative estimate
puts the number of MPX-supported deployments at 100s of millions
worldwide. Therefore, MPX is a ubiquitous—yet unused—resource.
In this paper, we leverage MPX for general purpose data storage
with emphasis on data hiding. Ability to hide data is a valuable re-
source in security. For example, in the enforcement of control-flow
integrity using a shadow stack, it is necessary to ensure integrity
of the shadow stack while accommodating frequent updates to
the shadow stack whenever there is a call or a ret instruction.
Similarly, it is often beneficial to isolate critical encryption keys
and passwords from memory in order to protect their integrity and
confidentiality in case of memory corruption and/or information
leakage. On the one hand, hiding data in the kernel is often im-
practical as it incurs (sometimes prohibitive) performance overhead
due to the expensive transition to/from user and kernel modes. But
on the other hand, recent attacks demonstrate that hiding data in
userland is ineffective even in a 64-bit address space[24].
Our contribution is codenamed Simplex, which is comprised
of a library enabling extrospection and manipulation of the MPX
context, a minimalist runtime that avoids the overhead associated
with the compiler-provided MPX runtime, a test suite verifying cor-
rectness, and evaluations demonstrating the practicality of Simplex.
Simplex provides abstractions to the underlying MPX operations
such that its “bounds" registers appear to behave identically to gen-
eral purpose registers, even though Intel does not provide specific
access and mutation instructions in the MPX extension. Simplex
completely avoids the bounds lookup table and associated runtime
costs, which form the main source of overhead for MPX use [25, 27].
Simplex provides storage in MPX registers optimally used to store
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data that is undesirable or risky to be stored in userspace memory,
when the data size is small (ideally 8×64 bits, although Simplex also
provides 4×128-bit operations), and when the data is infrequently
accessed. Simplex is particularly beneficial to use in cases such as
information hiding because previous works use a modified compiler
to reserve a general purpose register for hiding (e.g. [19, 21, 22, 34]).
Reserving registers is undesirable for two reasons: (1) it removes
a register from the allocation pool, which could in-turn impact
performance due to sub-optimal register allocation [5], and (2) it
affects interoperability when handwritten assembly or binaries not
compiled using the modified compiler may accidentally access or
modify the reserved register. This in turn may compromise confi-
dentiality or integrity of the hidden data. Because Simplex uses the
MPX bounds registers, and because the bounds registers are not
used unless the application was also explicitly compiled with MPX
support, we can ensure that no other code will access or modify
the hidden data or pointer stored inside the bounds register.
Our evaluation shows that Simplex is practical, and confirms
initial observations by Otterstad [27] and Oleksenko et al. [25] that
the majority of MPX’s performance cost comes from interacting
with the bounds lookup table and associated costs within the run-
time. We avoid this overhead because Simplex avoids using the
bounds lookup table by writing to the bounds registers directly
using the bndmk instruction and reading from the bounds registers
using the bndmov instruction to spill the contents into memory. We
evaluated for performance in two different ways. First, we created
three custom benchmark fixtures: a microbenchmark testing the
rate at which load and store operations can be completed to both
the %r15 general purpose register and the %bnd0 MPX register, a
macrobenchmark simulating information unhiding by traversing
and combining two hidden half-buffers, and a series of benchmark
implementations of memory operations from the string.h header.
Second, we compiled sandboxed versions of two SPEC CPU2017
benchmarks: 519.lbm, a particle-fluid simulation written in C, and
531.deepsjeng, a chess engine written in C++. Finally, we evaluated
for usability and correctness by modifying the OpenSSL Blowfish ci-
pher, then running the included integration and unit test suites.We
further discuss these evaluations in §5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel MPX
In 2012, Intel introduced PointerChecker, which provides bounds
checking in the software layer through the Intel Composer XE
development environment for C and C++ [13]. Recognizing the
potential for greatly improved performance through hardware sup-
port, Intel moved much of the Pointer Checker functionality into
MPX, announced in 2013 [30] and subsequently debuted in the
Skylake architecture in 2015.
MPX is a combination of an instruction set extension, compiler
and operating system support, and runtime library. It provides four
new 128-bit bounds registers (%BND0 through %BND3), each of which
are split into an upper half and lower half which have the purpose
of holding an upper bound and lower bound address. MPX also
employs the %BNDCFGx register pair to hold user-space and kernel-
space configuration, and a %BNDSTATUS register to hold status in-
formation in case of a bounds check failure. Intel designed MPX
with the overarching goal of compatibility with uninstrumented
code and unextended architectures. Where an MPX-supported CPU
encounters uninstrumented code, such as a vendor-provided library,
program execution continues with the cost that the CPU can no
longer provide memory safety because the bounds checks are not
performed unless a bndcl, bndcu, or bndcn instruction is executed.
Where an MPX-unsupported CPU encounters instrumented code,
or when MPX has not been initialized by setting %bndcfg[0], the
instructions are interpreted as nop instructions instead of triggering
unrecognized instruction exceptions.
2.2 Ubiquity of MPX
Although no direct count of deployed processors with MPX support
exists, we nonetheless believe that MPX is ubiquitous based on
inferences from publicly available data. For example, the Steam
Hardware and Survey for May 2019 – which automatically polls
the hardware of the Steam gaming service’s users – shows that
81.97% of users have an Intel processor [3]. Likewise, PassMark
reported that based on the benchmark baselines submitted from
July 2013 (when MPX was introduced) through the present, Intel
has had a market share between 73.60% and 82.50% [2]. This is an
important contrast to the Steam survey because it does a better
job of accounting for the server market, whereas the Steam survey
highlights the desktopmarket, specifically gaming computers. More
optimistically, Intel’s 2018 financial reports indicated that they held
84.2% of the desktop market, 87.9% of the notebook market, and
96.8% of the server market, for a weighted share of 90.41% [17].
Second, within Intel’s large market share, we believe that the
overwhelming majority are compatible with MPX based on sales
data. For example, according to Mindfactory – a leading German
computer parts retailer – not later than 2017, all of the Intel pro-
cessors that they sold were of the first MPX generation Skylake
architecture or more recent. By 2019, Skylake represented only 1%
of Mindfactory’s sales, with 92% belonging to the most recent Coffee
Lake or Coffee Lake-Refresh architectures [16]. This suggests that
the CPU sales dynamic heavily favors recent models, and thus ISA
extensions are quick to penetrate the market share. Lastly, we note
a 2016 estimate that by 2019 there would be over 1.3 billion desktop
computers worldwide [12]. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that
the potential impact of Simplex is high as numerous computers –
possibly hundreds of millions – will gain register storage through
repurposing their bounds registers. This benefit comes without
modification to the underlying architecture or perceptible cost to
the end user and has security-sensitive applications including in-
formation hiding or cryptographic operations.
2.3 Present State of MPX
MPX is impractical to use in its intended form. Although MPX
achieves a four- to five-fold speedup compared to PointerChecker [25],
it is not without significant issues hindering its widespread adop-
tion, foremost of which is the execution cost. MPX-enabled bench-
marks experience worst-case 200% performance overhead, 480%
memory overhead and 5.4x more page faults [25]. Additionally,
bounds table lookups appear to cause significant cache pressure.
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Figure 1: The MPX context as part of the larger Intel64 context. The blue pathway shows how information is written to the
bounds registers. The red pathway shows how information is read from the bounds registers (including sanitizing the stack
afterwards).
Even on legacy hardware, where the MPX instructions are inter-
preted in an idempotent manner, there is still up to a 50% slow-
down [31]. Furthermore, MPX cannot catch temporal memory
safety issues such as heap use-after-free and stack use-after-return [25],
it has false positives from otherwise legal C idioms due to restric-
tions on structure memory layouts [25, 31], it experiences false
negatives in response to undefined behaviors which cause inappro-
priate bounds loads [27], it conflicts with other Intel ISA extensions
such as SGX and TSX [25], and it has no explicit support for multi-
threading [25].
As a result, support for MPX has waned. Currently MPX’s only
compiler support is Intel’s own ICC since version 15.0 and Mi-
crosoft’s Visual Studio 2015 Update 1. GCC has dropped support
and Clang never supported MPX.
Despite the sunset of support for MPX in its memory safety
usage, we must emphasize that Simplex does not rely on either
compiler or operating system support to function. The Simplex
library provides all necessary runtime components and functions
for instrumentation, and the MPX context is part of the broader
XSAVE context, thus it is still saved and restored on context switches
even though Linux formally removed all MPX support as of kernel
version 5.6.
2.4 Information Hiding
Recent works demonstrate that information hiding techniques re-
lying on probabilistic mechanisms can be defeated. Göktaş et al.
demonstrated thread spraying [14] as a means of disclosing the safe
regions with a known structure. By repeatedly creating objects that
have safe stacks and regular stacks, then probing the space to find
one of these hidden safe stacks, they can effectively de-randomize
the address space. They also discovered that information in the
thread local storage (TLS) and the thread control block (TCB) pro-
vide clues to locating these stacks. Furthermore, Oikonomopoulos
et al. introduced allocation oracles which eliminate the need for
probing [24]. The idea is that an allocation oracle takes the size of
an area to allocate as input, and if successful returns the location
allocated. From this information and applying a binary search tech-
nique, an attacker can locate “holes” in the allocatable memory. If
the attacker has knowledge of how a defense’s sensitive data is laid
out, then these holes reveal where the sensitive data is not hidden.
With enough queries to the oracle, eventually the sensitive data
can be located, and the process avoids crashes or distinguishable
behavior usable by a runtime detector. Likewise, Evans et al. used
timing side channels to read the contents of hidden metadata with
or without crashes (the former is faster, the latter is difficult to
detect) [11]. Using this technique, they can de-randomize the loca-
tion of libraries such as libc, then use this to calculate the start of
the safe region. Once complete, modifying the contents of the safe
region permits an attacker to violate at least one implementation
of CPI.
Recent work has shown that having registers to simulate segmen-
tation as available in the IA-32 architecture can be used to provide
deterministic rather than probabilistic information hiding. Koning
et al. introduce MemSentry, a collection of implementations of in-
formation hiding relying on a variety of hardware support [18]. One
common point of these implementations is that they would benefit
from dedicated registers. Finally, two of the implementations of
Code Pointer Integrity require a dedicated register for information
hiding [19]. In the implementation released at the time of publica-
tion, the %fs register was reserved, however this may affect other
legitimate usages of the register. For example, operating systems
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sometimes use this register to access thread local storage (TLS).
Providing register storage via Simplex helps return reserved gen-
eral purpose registers to the compiler’s allocation list and restores
special purpose registers to their expected usage.
3 SIMPLEX
3.1 Threat Model
We assume a threat model similar to that offered by other work on
information hiding, namely Koning [18] and Yun [33]. Our system
under threat has an effective defense against code reuse, which
in turn prevents an attacker from arbitrarily calling the Simplex
library functions, even though he or she may have an arbitrary
read or write primitive. Although Simplex might be used to store
a pointer to a hidden memory region, it does not itself provide
isolation. We presume that the programmer has a Trusted Code Base
comprised of at least a privileged, trusted operating system and a
trusted build toolchain used to build the Simplex library. We con-
cede that an attacker may be able to load a Loadable Kernel Module
(LKM) that enables or disables MPX at a privileged operating sys-
tem level (and in fact, we provide one such implementation within
the Simplex code base). However, this would imply a compromised
kernel, which is outside our scope. That said, we show in §3.4, that
is not sufficient for an attacker to emplace values into the bounds
registers or leak values from the bounds registers in a way that is
beneficial to the attacker. Finally, we assume that Simplex is cor-
rectly implemented and is trusted by the programmer. We release
our code as open source, and offer a full test suite within that code
base as an assurance to that assumption.
3.2 Design Decisions
Previous works seeking to hide information from attackers have
chosen one of three options. 1) Storing information in the kernel
or in pages that can only be accessed in a privileged hardware
mode (e.g. [1, 15]) is secure as long as the operating system is not
compromised. However these schemes come with the obligation of
additional context switches for each query or update, hampering
performance. 2) A more performant choice is storing information in
a hidden region within the program’s address space (e.g. [9, 19, 22]).
Yet it relies on either probabilistic hiding measures which can be
defeated if the attacker has knowledge of the type of information be-
ing hidden, or if the attacker is able to tolerate crashes and restarts
while searching. 3) Alternatively, it is possible to reserve registers
from the compiler’s allocation pool and use these registers exclu-
sively for storing sensitive data. Once the registers are selected,
the defender can formally verify that no other code accesses these
registers, guaranteeing security. Nonetheless, there is still the con-
cern that available registers are limited and may conflict with other
defenses or dynamically linked code that use the reserved register.
3.3 Simplex-Enabled Compilation
In our evaluations, we manually replaced global pointer objects
and their reference/dereference statements with the necessary code
to enable bounds register usage. However, we do not feel this is
scalable. Consider the modifications made to the SPEC CPU2017
benchmarks: 519.lbm has just 1 KLOC and required 22 modifica-
tions, 531.deepsjeng has only 10 KLOC and required 173 modifi-
cations - these are very small code bases compared to 502.gcc (1.3
MLOC) and 526.blender (1.6 MLOC), the largest C/C++ bench-
marks in CPU2017. Making these modifications are expensive in
terms of developer effort and time, requiring both discovering and
understanding the global variables’ utilization. For example, modi-
fying the two SPEC CPU2017 benchmarks took about two days of
development time each. If the number and complexity of changes
necessary were to scale, implementing the larger benchmarks by
hand could take months! Therefore, we have designed but not yet
implemented a system using Clang’s annotation system to mark
variables as candidates for placement in a bounds register. This
reduces the developer’s workload to simply recognizing which vari-
ables should go into a bounds register, applying annotations to
the declarations, then compiling the source code with the options
necessary to enable Simplex.
First, the developer applies the necessary annotation at the vari-
able’s declaration. The compiler recognizes the annotation, and
maps that variable to one of the bounds registers, depending on its
size or throws a compilation error if no more register space is avail-
able. Next, the compiler pass replaces references to these variables
with appropriate Simplex function calls. If the variable is an lvalue,
it is replaced with a call to one of the mutator functions; if it is a
rvalue, it is replaced with a call to one of the accessor functions.
Developer annotation vs Automated discovery: On the one
hand, developer annotation has the benefit of precisely capturing
what is of security relevance and importance as per software design,
but on the other hand, developers are prone to make mistakes.
Therefore, we recommend 3 modes of operation that makes a trade
off between security and performance.
Whitelisting: In thismode, we allow a developer towhitelist security-
sensitive data that is stored in the MPX bounds registers by the
compiler. This is the most conservative and performance-friendly,
yet error-prone option.
Automatic inference: In this mode, the compiler employs a heuristic
approach to automatically profile and identify security sensitive
information and accordingly provisions MPX bounds registers to
manage such sensitive data. One option is to identify security-
sensitive documented API functions and perform backward slicing
to identify data of interest. This is the most aggressive option that
favors security over performance.
Blacklisting: Finally, as an intermediate option, blacklisting allows a
developer to define data items that should not be stored in the MPX
registers. While blacklisting is just as prone to human error as is
whitelisting, it is likely to have less adverse effects on security as
compared to mistakes in whitelisting.
3.4 Context Behavior
We performed experiments to determine the behavior of the MPX
context using the system under evaluation described in §5. We
identified three phases in the lifespan of a scheduling entity: its
creation (i.e. calling fork() for processes, or pthread_create()
for threads), mid-life – specifically when a parent or siblingmodifies
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its own context – and deletion (i.e calling exit() and wait() for
processes, or pthread_wait() and pthread_join() for threads).
3.4.1 Processes. According to the POSIX standard, upon calling
fork(), a new process is created by duplicating the parent. As part
of this duplication, the child has a memory space, processor context
and file descriptor table that are initially identical but separate from
the parent. However, the child has a unique process ID (and thus is
scheduled independently from its parent). Furthermore, the child
does not inherit the parent’s memory locks, signals, semaphores,
processor timers or counters.
At process creation, the child inherits an identical MPX context
to that of the parent because the MPX context is itself part of the
larger CPU context (see Figure 1). If MPX is enabled or disabled
because of the values on the %BNDCFGx[1:0] bits for the parent, it
will be likewise enabled or disabled for the child upon its creation
via fork(). Additionally, the values in the parent’s bounds registers
will be inherited by the child’s bounds registers, because the bounds
registers are a component of the MPX context. Meanwhile, during
the lifespan of both the child and the parent, changes in one process’
context do not affect another process even if one is an ancestor or
sibling of the other. Subsequently disabling or enabling MPX in a
parent does not confer this change in status to the child, nor does
changing the values of a parent’s bounds registers propagate to the
child. Furthermore, terminating one process does not change the
MPX context of any related process.
The reader may question whether a child might inadvertently
pass information about its Simplex state to the parent through
wait(). At a minimum, wait() passes the process id through its
return value. Optionally, it may pass a developer specified integer
values using wstatus from child to parent, and may pass an integer
error code through the errno flag. However no processor context
is contained in this information and therefore two processes using
Simplex are fully independent from each other beginning immedi-
ately after process creation. Thus there is no risk of leaking secrets
across processes when using Simplex above and beyond the risk
that is incurred by hiding that information in the process address
space or in a reserved register.
Briefly, upon creation of a process, the child inherits the context
of the parent, but this context is unshared thereafter. We summarize
these findings in Table 1.
3.4.2 Threads. POSIX threads are a kernel scheduling entity, such
that a single process contains multiple threads, all of which are
executing the same program. Thus although each process’ threads
share global memory, the threads must have their own call stack and
its own CPU context in order to maintain its own program counter.
When a process creates a new thread using pthread_create(),
the newly created thread initially inherits the calling process’ CPU
state, except that in order to begin execution at the specified start
routine, the program counter must be set to the appropriate address.
Accordingly, the newly created thread inherits the calling process’
MPX configuration and bounds registers context, similar to the
inheritance between a parent and child process described above.
Similar to the behavior shown by processes, the various threads of
a single process do not share the configuration nor bounds regis-
ters’ values once the thread is initialized; the created thread’s MPX
context is immediately independent from that of its creator.
Briefly, upon creation of a thread, the child inherits the context
of the parent, but this context is unshared thereafter. We summarize
these findings in Table 2.
3.4.3 Repetitive Initialization and Finalization. Because Simplex
provides methods to initialize and finalize its minimal MPX context,
the reader may question what would happen if a programmer or
attacker called these methods repeatedly (whether by accident or
malice). We created a toy program that tests these corner cases.
First, we initialize the program, setting the bounds registers to
known values, then initialize the program a second time. We found
that each time the MPX context is initialized, the bounds registers’
lower bounds are set to the system maximum unsigned value, and
the upper bounds are set to 0. In MPX’s design use case, this results
in a guaranteed passed bounds check until the bounds register is set
to some allocated object’s bounds. In the Simplex use case, repeated
initialization destroys the values inside the bounds registers by
resetting them to the conservative bounds values. Although this
may allow an attack against availability, it does not allow an attack
seeking disclosure. Furthermore, it is no more dangerous than the
numerous xor reg reg gadgets which are used by the compiler
to place a zero value in a register.
We also found that after finalization, each of BND1 through
BND3 are reset. However, BND0 displays unusual behavior in that
while the lower bound is reset, the upper bound receives a random
large value (the most significant bit is always set, but otherwise
there is no identifiable behavior). Thus subsequent repeated final-
izations are similar to repeated initializations in that they can cause
availability but not disclosure problems. We summarize these find-
ings in Figure 3.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Components of Simplex
Unfortunately, there is no means of directly accessing the MPX
bounds registers via a mov instruction. Each of GCC, ICC and Mi-
crosoft’s Visual C++ compiler do offer intrinsics, although these are
only available if a MPX runtime is available and providing bounds
checking [29]. This means it is not possible to use these intrin-
sics for accessing the bounds registers without also suffering the
continual risk of a bounds check clobbering the bounds registers.
Therefore, within Simplex we provide a system readiness check, a
minimal runtime to enable and disable MPX execution without the
additional overhead of bounds checking and a bounds lookup table,
accessor and mutator functions, and a test suite to verify proper
operation of the library. We demonstrate usage of this functionality
in Figure 2.
System Readiness Check. Although it is possible for a user to test
whether their system can support MPX from the command line
using commands such as lscpu and sysctl, a program must be
able to verify readiness itself and abort further execution if it cannot
prove its readiness. This is because CPUs which do not support
MPX will silently interpret these MPX instructions as NOPs. We
have isolated the necessary checks from the GCC 5.0 MPX runtime
library. These checks verify that %CPUID[14] is set (indicating that
the CPU supports the MPX extension), and that %XCR0[3:4] are
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Parent Child
Event Enabled? BND0 Enabled? BND0
Parent calls process_specific_init()
and setbnd(BND0,1) ✓ 1
Parent calls fork() ✓ 1 ✓ 1
Child calls setbnd(BND0,2) ✓ 1 ✓ 2
Child calls process_specific_finish() ✓ 1 ✗ -
Child calls exit() ✓ 1
Parent calls process_specific_finish() ✗ -
Table 1: Simplex context behavior for a parent and child process.
Parent Child 1 Child 2
Event Enabled? BND0 Enabled? BND0 Enabled? BND0
Parent calls process_specific_init()
and setbnd(0,0) ✓ 0
Parent calls pthread_create()
for Child 1 ✓ 0 ✓ 1
Parent calls pthread_create()
for Child 2 ✓ 0 ✓ 1 ✓ 2
Child 1 calls setbnd(0,1) ✓ 0 ✓ 1 ✓ 2
Child 2 calls setbnd(0,2) ✓ 0 ✓ 1 ✓ 2
Child 2 calls process_specific_finish() ✓ 0 ✓ 1 ✗ -
Child 1 calls process_specific_finish() ✓ 0 ✗ - ✗ -
Child 1 and Child 2 each call
pthread_exit(), Parent calls
pthread_join() for each child
✓ 0
Parent calls process_specific_finish() ✗ -
Table 2: Simplex context behavior for a parent and two child threads.
Initialization Finalization
First Subsequent First Subsequent
Config Registers Enabled Enabled Disabled Disabled
Bounds Registers Reset Reset BND0: Undefined,BND1-3: Reset
BND0: Undefined,
BND1-3: Reset
Table 3: Simplex context behavior during repetitive initialization and finalization.
set (indicating that the CPU should include the MPX registers as
part of a context save and restore).
Enabling and Disabling Functions. We also provide a way of en-
abling and disabling MPX operations within both kernel mode and
user mode applications. This can be done by setting flags on the
%BNDCFGS and %BNDCFGU registers respectively. %BNDCFGx[0] en-
ables interpretation of theMPX instruction extension, and %BNDCFGx[1]
enables bounds register preservation when legacy instructions are
encountered. Before these flags are set, we perform a system readi-
ness check. Unlike theGCC runtime, we do not set %BNDCFGx[63:12]
with the base address of the bounds table. This minimizes startup
overhead, and also provides a small measure of security since at-
tempting to access the bounds table as a means of leaking the
contents of a bounds register will result in a segmentation fault.
Accessor and Mutator Functions. For each of the four bounds
registers, a common accessor and mutator wrapper function pro-
vides a handle to the bounds register. There are four varieties of
each wrapper function: lower-half 64 bits only, upper-half 64 bits
only, all 128 bits, and a “quick” lower-half only which does not
attempt to save the upper-half nor clean the stack of any spilled
values. The applicable bounds register is selected through an enu-
merator with four values, thus corresponding “BND0” to the integral
value 0 and so forth. Within each wrapper function is the neces-
sary extended assembly statements to either set or get the values
from the bounds register. When writing to the bounds registers,
the value to be written is marshaled from the function arguments
into a sib-addressed bndmk instruction. When getting, the bounds
register is spilled onto the stack above the stack pointer without
moving the stack pointer as there is no bounds register-to-general
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#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include "simplex.h"
-static LBM_GridPtr srcGrid , dstGrid;
void MAIN_initialize( const MAIN_Param* param ) {
+ process_specific_init ();
- LBM_allocateGrid( (double **) &srcGrid );
- LBM_allocateGrid( (double **) &dstGrid );
+ double* ptr;
+ LBM_allocateGrid (&ptr);
+ qsetbndl(BND0 , (uint64_t) ptr);
+ ptr = 0;
+ LBM_allocateGrid (&ptr);
+ qsetbndl(BND1 , (uint64_t) ptr);
+ ptr = 0;
- LBM_initializeGrid( *srcGrid );
- LBM_initializeGrid( *dstGrid );
+ LBM_initializeGrid( *(( LBM_GridPtr)qgetbndl(BND0)) );
+ LBM_initializeGrid( *(( LBM_GridPtr)qgetbndl(BND1)) );
}
void MAIN_finalize( const MAIN_Param* param ) {
- LBM_freeGrid( (double **) &srcGrid );
- LBM_freeGrid( (double **) &dstGrid );
+ double* p0 = (double *) qgetbndl(BND0);
+ double* p1 = (double *) qgetbndl(BND1);
+ LBM_freeGrid (&p0);
+ p0 = 0;
+ LBM_freeGrid (&p1);
+ p1 = 0;
+ process_specific_finish ();
}
Figure 2: A diff file example of modifications needed to
store global pointers in bounds registers from the lbm bench-
mark. In this example, the global pointers srcGrid and
dstGrid are placed in BND0 and BND1 respectively.
purpose register instruction. This is accomplished using a bndmov
instruction. As mentioned above, all accessor functions except the
quick variants will sanitize this value on the stack in case the value
stored within the bounds registers is sensitive. We have verified
that our extended assembly statements to perform the sanitization
are not optimized by either GCC or Clang through disassembly and
manual inspection. See Figure 1 for more information on data flows
to and from the MPX context.
4.2 Security Impact of the Simplex
Implementation
Canella et al. recently reported a variety of Meltdown transient
execution attacks, one of which is the Meltdown-BR (Bounds Check
Bypass) attack [7, 20]. Dekel also describes a post-exploitation
technique called BoundHook, which allows an attacker to cause
a bounds check exception in a user-mode context, then catch the
exception to gain control over the thread execution [10]. With both
of these vulnerabilities, Simplex does not increase a program’s
attack surface because both require a #BR exception to be raised
in order to initiate exploitation. Since Simplex does not use the
bndcl, bndcu, or bndcn instructions, no such exception will be
raised by our code. Additionally, because BoundsHook requires that
the attacker has also already compromised machine administrator
rights, any attacker who can successfully execute a BoundsHook
intrusion can simply observe and modify the MPX context without
the need to further compromise Simplex.
Because Simplex can be used in multi-threaded applications,
we must address the dangers that an attacker-controlled thread
could victimize a thread using Simplex to interact with the MPX
bounds registers. There is a short time window where data being
loaded from the bounds register to a system register is spilled onto
the stack. We provide one mitigation in that Simplex will zero
out the memory used by the bndmov spill instruction immediately
after copying to the destination register in all accessor functions
except for qgetbndl() which is performance- rather than security-
optimized. Because this zeroing is not guaranteed to be atomic, there
is still a small risk that the attacker-controlled thread with a pointer
to the bottom of the victim thread’s stack could read this memory
in a race condition assisted by a scheduler interrupt sometime
between the spill from the bounds register to the time the stack
memory is sanitized. We instrumented our library using a PAPI
API [4] software defined event to measure the frequency of context
switches within the Simplex accessor functions and discovered that
such a sequence of events did not occur. We hypothesize that this is
because the accessor functions do not require any system calls and
are very short-lived, and thus unlikely to trigger the scheduler’s
watchdog timer.
5 EVALUATION
We conducted our evaluation on an 8-core Intel Core i7-7700K CPU
at 4.20 GHz with 62.8 GiB RAM running Ubuntu 20.04 LTS and the
Linux 5.4 kernel. The system under evaluation conforms to POSIX.1-
2017, and uses GNU libc and POSIX thread implementation version
2.27.
5.1 Benchmarks
We authored three benchmark fixtures to evaluate whether Simplex
attains performance that is comparable to using general purpose
registers.
5.1.1 Load-Store Benchmark. First, we authored amicro-benchmark
that tests load and store performance when Simplex employs the
%bnd0 MPX bounds register compared to handwritten assembly
using general purpose registers using %r15, segmentation registers
using %gs:0, and the MMX and XMM instruction set extension
registers using %mm0 and %xmm1 respectively, see Figure 3. We find
that the mean of writing to the MPX bounds registers is comparable
to writing to the general purpose registers (1.00x), segmentation
registers (1.01x), and MMX registers (0.98x). This is because all
four of these operations have a fast, dedicated assembly instruction
for writing to the register - either mov or bndmk. The fastest assem-
bly instruction option for writing to the XMM registers is movaps,
which moves four aligned, packed, single-precision floating point
values to the XMM register. However, it incurs significant overhead
compared to the mov instruction because of microarchitectural lim-
itations and thus the rate of MPX bounds register writes is 13.90x
faster.
Loading from the MPX bounds registers is a different story. Addi-
tional overhead results because the MPX extension does not contain
an instruction to move from a bounds register directly to another
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register, whether a bounds register or otherwise; bndmov only pro-
vides a bounds register to memory spill operation. Therefore load
operations from a bounds register require that the data is first
spilled to the quadword above the stack pointer through a bndmov
instruction, then recovered through two additional mov instructions.
General purpose register, segmentation register and MMX regis-
ter loads can all be accomplished by a single mov instruction and
thus MPX bounds register loads are only 0.74x , 0.32x , and 0.73x
as fast, respectively. Segmentation register loads are particularly
fast when repeatedly executed because of cache effects. Conversely,
MPX bounds register loads are 1.69x faster than XMM register
loads because these loads also must spill to stack, and because of
the aforementioned micro-architectural limitations of the apsmov
instruction.
Our findings also confirm the micro-architectural analysis of
Oleksenko et al. [25] which found that it was not necessarily the
MPX bounds operations that were particularly expensive, but the
management of the bounds table through a two-level table lookup
– particularly the bndstx and bndldx instructions. Simplex uses
neither of these instructions and thus avoids their overhead.
5.1.2 Traversal Benchmark. We authored a benchmark simulat-
ing unhiding information from two hidden buffers by combining
their contents, as first suggested by Shamir [32]. In our benchmark,
a buffer is split into two halves, with two registers dedicated to
pointing at the half-buffers. These pointers are repeatedly indexed
and de-referenced to traverse the buffer, which ranges in size from
4 KiB to 16 MiB (chosen to reflect common page sizes for target
operating systems and the x86-64 ISA). We repeat this unhiding
traversal for 100 runs of 1000 iterations, and measure an elapsed
time for all iterations to determine a geometric mean in order to
calculate a performance overhead. Because this requires two load
operations from a register for each byte unhidden, performance
overhead rapidly accumulates, in this case between 272.45% and
282.17% depending on buffer size. See Table 4 for full results.
General Purpose Simplex Overhead
Size X Med X Med X Med
4K 1.1 1.0 3.9 3.9 272.5 278.1
8K 2.1 2.1 7.8 7.8 279.0 279.7
1M 266.5 265.9 1018.3 1018.1 282.2 282.9
16M 4277.3 4274.5 16335.7 16334.1 281.9 282.1
Table 4: Performance overhead incurred during a simula-
tion of traversing two buffers and combining their values to
decode an information-hidden buffer (as in Shamir’s secret
hiding scheme). Each experiment is run on four buffer sizes
for 1000 iterations and measured for elapsed time. Buffer
size is expressed in bytes, measurements are expressed in
seconds, and overhead in percentage. X = Mean,Med =
Median.
5.1.3 String Operations. Third, we implemented five memory oper-
ations from the string.h header, using reference implementations
from the libgcc codebase. We then reimplemented these functions
for Simplex to replace any passed argument that contains the ad-
dress of a buffer with calls to instead load the address from an
applicable bounds register. These benchmarks show that the per-
formance cost of Simplex is easily amortized, as we found that the
maximum overhead was only 5.86%, and a 0.69% overall geomet-
ric mean. In the specific case of these function implementations,
benchmarks that do not short-circuit (i.e. memcpy, memmove and
memset) are able to amortize the cost fully compared to functions
that do short-circuit (i.e. memcmp, memchr). We do not claim that
there is a performance benefit to Simplex, simply that if there is
a performance cost, it is small enough to be unnoticeable to the
user and that it is offset by the utility of the additional registers
provided by Simplex.
5.2 Modifications to Existing Codebases
5.2.1 SPECCPU2017. Wehand-modified two SPECCPU2017 bench-
marks, 519.lbm which simulates fluid flow through lattices, and
531.deepsjeng which plays chess. In both cases, we selected the
two global pointers to data structures that had the highest number
of uses in order to fully stress the Simplex library. Although we
selected global objects, it should be emphasized that Simplex is not
limited to just globals; heap or local objects could also be placed
in the bounds registers. Using the SPEC benchmarks proves both
correctness – the output is verified against a known correct out-
put – and demonstrates performance cost of using Simplex. We
measured the performance rate ratio between runs with an unmod-
ified benchmark and one where frequently used pointers to global
variables were placed into a bounds register. This performance ra-
tio was between 1.000 and 1.006 for 519.lbm, and 0.975 and 0.985
for 531.lbm (see Table 5). Higher performance rate ratios indicate
faster execution, but differ from performance overhead measure-
ments since performance rate takes into account the number of
threaded copies running simultaneously.
5.2.2 OpenSSL. We then modified the OpenSSL Blowfish symmet-
ric key cipher to demonstrate how Simplex might be used in a
security application. In our modified Blowfish cipher, the address
of the cipher’s global key schedule structure is stored in a bounds
register. Therefore wherever an encryption or decryption function
would ordinarily receive a pointer to the key schedule as a func-
tion parameter, we instead pass a null value as the parameter and
thus de-reference the bounds register at each usage of the param-
eter. Although the OpenSSL test suite provides test run time in
its output, the Blowfish correctness test is very short in duration.
As a result, our observed runtime overheads are smaller than the
reported measurement resolution and not particularly useful as
a metric of performance. We do not wish to imply that replacing
function parameters with Simplex function calls is a way to achieve
higher performance, only to state that Simplex presents minimal
performance cost. We also wish to emphasize that although we
placed a pointer to a key schedule structure in the bounds registers
for this evaluation, this structure is stored on the heap in the un-
modified Blowfish cipher and therefore we did not introduce attack
surface in our modified cipher. Additionally, some other OpenSSL
ciphers’ keys are less than 512 bits in size and would fit entirely
within the bounds registers. The MPX bounds registers can hold
any value, not just pointer values.
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Figure 3: Rate of load and store operations. Box and whisker plot showsmedian, minimum/maximum, and first/third quartile
operation rates. We use %r15 for General, %gs:0 for Segmentation, %mm0 for MMX, %xmm1 for XMM and %bnd0 for MPX. The test
consisted of 104 runs, with 106 iterations per run. We report the steady-state rate of operations accomplished per second.
Variables in Bounds Register Copies Run Time Base Rate Ratio
519.lbm_r
None 1 202 5.21
None 4 605 6.96
srcGrid→bnd0 1 201 5.24 1.006
srcGrid→bnd0 4 605 6.96 1.000
srcGrid→bnd0, dstGrid→bnd1 1 202 5.23 1.004
srcGrid→bnd0, dstGrid→bnd1 4 606 6.96 1.000
531.deepsjeng_r
None 1 283 4.04
None 4 290 15.8
state→bnd0, gamestate→bnd1 1 288 3.98 0.985
state→bnd0, gamestate→bnd1 4 297 15.4 0.975
Table 5: Simplex SPEC CPU2017 evaluation data. Run time refers to how long the benchmark took to complete. Base Rate
refers to the raw performance of this benchmark relative to the SPEC CPU2017 reference machine and thus provides insight
into the underlying system under test. Ratio refers to the ratio of the modified benchmark’s performance to the unmodified
benchmark’s performance taking into account the number of copies running on a multi-threaded system. ratio < 1 implies
the modified benchmark ran slower than the unmodified benchmark.
5.2.3 DPlus. Finally, we modified DPlus, a simple web browser
written entirely in pure C++. The choice of implementation lan-
guage is critical since Simplex is not compatible with interpreted
languages like Javascript, and the majority of modern browsers
implement at least some portion of the code in Javascript for com-
patibility with popular web toolkits. We verified correctness using
the DW window toolkit’s native functionality tests.
6 RELATEDWORK
Existing Evaluations. Significant exploration of Intel MPX gen-
erally find MPX to be flawed as a memory safety tool, and thus
inspired our investigation as to whether MPX could be repurposed.
Serebryany unfavorably evaluated the performance of Intel MPX
versus the Address Sanitizer memory safety tool. [31] Notably, he
discovered not only up to a 2.5x performance slowdown and 4.0x
memory overhead on some benchmarks, but that the MPX instruc-
tions still exhibit a 50% slowdown evenwhen they should be ignored
on a system which does not have MPX support or has disabled it.
He also identifies three categories of false positives that Address
Sanitizer does not have: atomic pointers, un-instrumented bounds
changes, and those caused by compiler optimizations after instru-
mentation. Otterstad examined the effectiveness of early implemen-
tations of MPX, identifying eight new categories of false positives
and false negatives beyond those explored by Serebryany. [27] Fur-
thermore, he demonstrates at least one toy program which can be
victimized by ROP attacks because of these false positives and false
negatives. Oleksenko et al. performed a study of the performance,
security guarantees, and usability issues of MPX after it became
available in production hardware. [25] Furthermore, their empirical
study was backed by an exhaustive investigation of how MPX is
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Figure 4: String.h benchmarks’ median performance over-
head at varying buffer sizes.
Size memcmp memcpy memmove memset memchr
X Med X Med X Med X Med X Med
4K 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.53 0.57 1.18 1.20 0.00 -0.01
8K -0.29 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.22 2.03 2.88 -0.24 0.00
1M 5.58 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 1.41 1.44 0.02 0.00
16M 5.86 2.29 -0.33 -0.06 - - 1.46 1.46 0.02 0.02
Figure 5: String.h benchmarks’ performance overhead
when modified to pass pointer arguments in bounds reg-
isters.Performance overheads are expressed as percent-
ages, while buffer sizes are expressed as kilobytes (K) or
megabytes (M). X = Mean,Med = Median
actually implemented at the hardware, operating system and soft-
ware levels. This investigation is used to support their quantitative
findings.
Other Uses of Intel MPX. We are not the only members of the
community to propose repurposing MPX. Code Pointer Integrity
(CPI) maintains a safe region to protect function pointers, return
addresses and other pointers to code called a “safe stack”. [19]
The authors propose one implementation of CPI using MPX to
store the safe region’s metadata, gaining performance benefits by
moving some of the implementation into MPX’s hardware acceler-
ated checks. Burow further investigates using MPX to isolate CPI’s
shadow stacks and provide a highly-efficient implementation. [6]
We note that Simplex performs much of the management func-
tionality they described, and could be used in conjunction with
their defenses. Opaque Control-Flow Integrity (O-CFI) combines
fine-grained code layout randomization with coarse-grained CFI
in order to defeat sophisticated attacks seeking in-memory layout
information to launch code-reuse attacks. [22] O-CFI uses MPX
instructions to perform branch instrumentation, where legal branch
targets are “chunked” together into a minimal address range, simi-
lar to a buffer. Oleksenko proposes a system combining MPX for
hardware fault detection with Intel Transactional Synchronization
Extensions (TSX) for fault rollback. [26] The underlying principle
is that if a pointer’s value is corrupted by a fault, then it will likely
point to a dramatically different address outside the bounds of the
referent object. MemSentry is a deterministic memory isolation
framework addressing the threats of allocation oracles, thread spray-
ing, crash-resistant memory disclosure primitives, and various side
channels. [18] The authors use MPX and Intel Memory Protection
Keys (MPK) to describe a more efficient method of intra-process
isolation, similar to that provided by the kernel through mprotect
and Software Fault Isolation (SFI). CFIXX is a C++ defense for vir-
tual table pointers providing Object Type Integrity (OTI). [6] CFIXX
protects against corruption attacks against OTI by protecting the
memory region containing the OTI metadata with selective MPX in-
strumentation. By reimagining the layout of the address space, they
are able to halve the number of bound checks compared to a full
memory safety solution provided by MPX. BOGO extends the MPX
bounds tables to not only provide spatial memory safety, but also
temporal memory safety. [35] Since MPX already initializes bounds
table entries at allocation, BOGO additionally invalidates these en-
tries upon deallocation and thus gains temporal memory safety.
Since doing this operation at every deallocation can be expensive,
the authors also introduce more efficient techniques for managing
the deallocation metadata updates and for scanning the bounds
table. DataShield provides three methods for coarse-grained bounds
checks for non-sensitive pointer dereferences, one of which utilizes
MPX to avoid the need to information hide the non-sensitive data
regions. [8] Up to four of these regions’ addresses are initialized
in the MPX bounds register at program startup, with each pointer
dereference in order to assure that the pointer does not escape the
non-sensitive region. The Linux kernel can be protected against
Just-in-Time code reuse attacks by kRˆX, which hardens benign
read operations that an attacker might reuse to disclose code to find
useful JIT gadgets. [28] Intel MPX is used in one implementation
of kRˆX to accelerate the execute-only range checks to reduce the
performance overhead.
Repurposing Hardware Registers. The idea of repurposing hard-
ware registers as with Simplex is not unique. TRESOR is a patch
that implements the AES encryption algorithm for the Linux kernel,
but provides additional security by utilizing the Intel AES-NI in-
struction set extension and by keeping encryption keys instead of in
RAM. [23] Ginseng keeps secrets in an encrypted secure stack until
they are needed, then moves the secret into dedicated registers. [33]
This has the effect of reducing the amount of sensitive data kept
in the ARM TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) and
thus reduces the TEE’s attack surface and does not require placing
the operating system within the trusted computing base.
7 CONCLUSION
Simplex is an open-source library repurposing the Intel®MPX in-
struction set (ISA) extension. We present evidence that suggests
that MPX is ubiquitous, and show that MPX bounds registers can
be repurposed as general purpose storage. In particular, they can be
used to hide security sensitive data. We demonstrate that although
the MPX ISA lacks a dedicated instruction to move data directly to
and from the bounds registers, it is still possible to do so through
the available spill and fill instructions, bndmk and bndmov. Further-
more, we show that such operations are not overly-burdensome,
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especially once the operations are amortized across the entire exe-
cution of a program. We do this through a collection of refactored
programs and a partial implementation of the C standard library.
8 AVAILABILITY
We make Simplex available to the community as open-source soft-
ware at https://github.com/bingseclab/simplex.
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